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THE AMAZON ABLAZE: ARE THE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE
BOLSONARO ADMINISTRATION IN
CONTRAVENTION OF BRAZIL’S
COMMITMENT TO THE CONVENTION
ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY?
INTRODUCTION
n June of 1992, members of the United Nations (UN) gath-
ered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to address the growing in-
ternational concern over the effects that economic development
has upon the earth’s natural environment.1 The international
agreements produced from this conference—aptly named the
Earth Summit—marked a sea change in international envi-
ronmental protection laws.2 A great number of the treaties
signed during the Earth Summit contained provisions that
promote the use of environmentally sustainable development
practices.3 One such treaty signed was the multilateral Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which commits its signa-
tory members to the preservation and conservation of the bio-
logically diverse ecosystems located within the territorial juris-
diction of each contracting party.4 The CBD requires each con-
tracting party to establish and maintain legislation for the pro-
tection of those ecosystems identified as biologically diverse.5
1. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/United-




4. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79.
5. Id. Article 12 of the treaty requires that the contracting parties “estab-
lish and maintain programmes for scientific and technical education and
training in measures for the identification, conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity and its components. . . .” (emphasis added) Id. at 8.
Thus, it is the responsibility of each contracting party to individually create a
system for the identification of biological diversity within its own territorial
borders.
I
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Brazil, the Earth Summit’s host nation, committed itself to the
CBD by signing it during the conference.6
It should come as no surprise that Brazil was selected as the
host nation for the Earth Summit; the Amazonian Rainforest
comprises approximately 40% of Brazil’s total landmass and is
the world’s largest river basin and most biologically diverse
ecosystem.7 Teeming with an abundance of life, the Amazon is
home to millions of plant and animal species; this unique biome
has produced tremendous strides in the areas of medical re-
search and pharmacology.8 Moreover, the Amazon is truly in-
ternational in nature as its ecosystem spans far beyond the ge-
ographical boundaries of Brazil and into the territorial jurisdic-
tion of eight other countries.9
Recently, however, the biological diversity of the Amazon has
been threatened by a rampage of fires that have razed portions
of the rainforest; Reuters reported in August of 2019 that the
Brazilian Amazonian Rainforest had experienced over seventy-
eight-thousand forest fires in the year of 2019 alone.10 Im-
6. Status of Treaties, U. N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXV
II-8&chapter=27&clang=_en (last visited June 23, 2020).
7. Amazon Rainforest, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Amazon-Rainforest (last visited Sept. 4,
2019); see also Henry McGee & Kurt Zimmerman, The Deforestation of the
Brazilian Amazon: Law, Politics, and International Cooperation, 21 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 513, 513–17 (1990).
8. See Amazon Rainforest, supra note 7. Scientists estimate that roughly
half of the world’s species inhabit the Amazon Rainforest, and it is approxi-
mated that there are 80,000 different plant and 30,000,000 different animal
species living in the Rainforest. McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 516.
Furthermore, scientist studying the chemical properties of Amazonian flora
and fauna have discovered a plethora of medicinal uses for the chemicals
originating from this biologically diverse region. Id. For example, the chemi-
cals necessary for the medicine quinine were discovered in, and derived from,
the Amazonian Rainforest. Id.
9. Those countries are: Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, French Gui-
ana, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela. Benjamin Elisha Sawe, Coun-
tries Sharing the Amazon Rainforest, WORLD ATLAS,
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-sharing-the-amazon-
rainforest.html (last visited June 23, 2020).
10. Jake Spring, Explainer: Why are the Amazon fires sparking a crisis for
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portantly, these forest fires, if not effectively quelled, have the
potential to devastate the entire Amazonian Rainforest ecosys-
tem.11 Environmental officials and scientists alike believe that
the increase of forest fires is attributable to the dramatic up-
tick in illegal deforestation of the Brazilian Amazonian Rain-
forest.12 Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro, since taking office in
January 2019, has publicly endorsed and encouraged deforesta-
tion of the Amazon as a means to spur economic development.13
Given that Brazil’s environmental protection laws prohibit de-
forestation of the Amazon, the Bolsonaro administration has
taken an anti-enforcement policy by refusing to criminally pur-
sue those engaged in this illegal activity.14 Many believe that
this lack of enforcement has emboldened individuals to engage
in illegal deforestation practices, which led to the barrage of
forest fires within the Amazonian Rainforest of Brazil.15
This Note will argue that Jairo Bolsonaro’s rise to power co-
incided with a significant increase in the illegal deforestation of
the Amazon Rainforest and the manmade forest fires that en-
sued as a consequence.16 Moreover, this Note will demonstrate
that the forest fires resulting from persistent illegal deforesta-
tion have the potential for triggering “dieback,” which occurs
when an ecosystem has been so irreparably damaged and
11. Max Fisher, ‘It’s Really Close’: How the Amazon Rainforest Could Self-
Destruct, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019),
www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/world/americas/amazon-rainforest-fires-
climate.html.
12. Ernesto Londoño & Letícia Casado, With Amazon on Fire, Environ-
mental Officials in Open Revolt Against Bolsonaro, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/world/americas/amazon-fires-
brazil.html.
13. Letícia Casado & Ernesto Londoño, Under Brazil’s Far-Right Leader,
Amazon Protections Slashed and Forests Fall, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2019),
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/world/americas/brazil-deforestation-amazon-
bolsonaro.html?module=inline.
14. Id.; see also Jake Spring & Stephen Eisenhammer, Exclusive: As fires
race through Amazon, Brazil’s Bolsonaro weakens environmental agency,
REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-
environment-ibama-exclusive/exclusive-as-fires-race-through-amazon-brazils-
bolsonaro-weakens-environment-agency-idUSKCN1VI14I.
15. Casado & Londoño, supra note 13.
16. Spring, supra note 10; see also Casado & Londoño, supra note 13; Scott
Wallace, Inside the faltering fight against illegal Amazon logging, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 28, 2019),
www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/08/brazil-logging/.
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fragmented that it can no longer survive.17 Thus, if dieback
were to occur, the very existence of the Amazon Rainforest
would be jeopardized.18 As such, all of the countries in which
the Amazon Rainforest extends would be harmed by the loss of
this biologically diverse ecosystem if the Rainforest were to
succumb to dieback.19 This Note will examine whether Presi-
dent Bolsonaro’s shift in policy, which not only contradicts Bra-
zil’s existing environmental protection laws but also conflicts
with the conservation mandates of the CBD, places Brazil in
violation of its treaty commitment.20 Ultimately, this Note will
explore the potential for a CBD party member to bring a cog-
nizable cause of action against Brazil, either before an arbitral
tribunal or the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and
whether the party will be able to effectively claim that Brazil
has breached its obligations as set forth in the CBD.21
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION LAWS
In the decades running up to the Earth Summit, the federal
government of Brazil took strides towards establishing a vast
regulatory system to protect and preserve the country’s unique
ecosystems.22 This expansion of environmental protection laws
came at a time of rampant deforestation of the Amazon.23 Be-
tween 1966 and 1975, the Brazilian Amazonian Rainforest lost
over 11,000,000 hectares of forest.24 As a means to legally com-
bat the degradation of the environment, in August of 1981, the
Brazilian government enacted Law 6.938, “Law of the National
17. Fisher, supra note 11.
18. Id.; see generally William F. Laurance, Heraldo L. Vasconcelos &
Thomas E. Lovejoy, Forest Loss and Fragmentation in the Amazon: Implica-
tions for Wildlife Conservation, 34 ORYX 39 (2000).
19. Fisher, supra note 11.
20. Alejandra Borunda, See how much of the Amazon is burning, how it
compares to other years, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 29, 2019),
www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/08/amazon-fires-cause-
deforestation-graphic-map/; see also Londoño & Casado, supra note 12; see
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 8.
21. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 27.
22. See generally José Drummond & Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau, Brazilian
Environmental Laws and Policies, 1934–2002: A Critical Overview, 28 L. &
POL’Y 83 (2006).
23. McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 521.
24. Id.
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Environmental Policy,” which proved to be a watershed devel-
opment in Brazilian environmental protection law.25 This legis-
lation created a federal environmental management agency,
the National Environmental System (SISNAMA), under which
the country’s environmental protection enforcement agencies
function.26
The importance of Law 6.938 is punctuated by the fact that it
was enacted during a time of significant economic growth.27
The Brazilian Amazonian Rainforest is brimming with an
abundance of valuable raw materials, both flora and fauna,
ripe for harvesting.28 Nevertheless, there were those in the
Brazilian government who realized that unrestrained develop-
ment of the Amazon could lead to collateral, negative environ-
mental consequences.29 As a result, the Brazilian government,
in the mid-1980s, began to shift away from the economic policy
of unbounded “developmentalist” growth in favor of a federal
policy that embraced environmentally sustainable social and
economic growth.30 The Brazilian government took an affirma-
tive step towards ensuring the environmentally sustainable
economic growth of the country by creating an executive over-
sight agency.31 In February of 1989, Brazil enacted Law 7.735,
which created the Institute of the Environment and Renewable
Natural Resources (IBAMA).32 This agency was created for the
purpose of promulgating and enforcing environmental protec-
tion regulations, as well as for monitoring and controlling the
conservation and preservation of Brazil’s natural environ-
ments.33
Within a mere seven years, the Brazilian government had es-
tablished a framework for an environmental regulatory and
enforcement agency.34 Thus was the pro-environmental politi-
cal climate of Brazil in the year 1992, when Rio de Janeiro
25. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 22, at 92.
26. Id. at 92–94; see also MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL
BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN 22 (2017).
27. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 22, at 83–84.
28. SeeMcGee & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 516.
29. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 22, at 83–84.
30. Id.
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hosted the Earth Summit and the CBD was proposed.35 As one
of the original signatories to the CBD, Brazil ratified the multi-
lateral treaty on February 28, 1994.36 Pursuant to the conven-
tion’s requirement of establishing a plan for the protection of
biologically diverse ecosystems, Brazil enacted Decree 4.339 in
2002, which set forth the objectives and principles for the
preservation of biological diversity through the implementation
of a National Plan.37 Among the various objectives stated in the
Decree, Article 2 explicitly states that the sovereign—i.e., Bra-
zil—has the right to “exploit” its own biological resources “pur-
suant to [its] own environment and development policies.”38
Thus, a plain reading of the text indicates that if Brazil were to
avail itself of the biological materials produced in the Amazon,
it must do so in accordance with Brazil’s existing environmen-
tal policies.39 Directly after preserving Brazil’s sovereign rights,
Article 3 charges Brazil with the responsibility of preserving
and conserving the biological diversity within its own territori-
al jurisdiction, as well as ensuring that those activities that
take place within the country of Brazil do not affect the biologi-
cal diversity of other territories.40 Pursuant to the objectives
stated in Decree 4.339, in April of 2006, the federal government
of Brazil passed Decree 5.758, which created the National Stra-
tegic Plan for Protected Areas (PNAP).41 To implement the
PNAP, Decree 5.758 stated that the Ministry of Environment
must develop environmental protection regulations for the pro-
tected, biologically diverse areas identified in Brazil; the De-
cree also specified that implementation of the PNAP must be
evaluated every five years.42
35. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, supra
note 1.
36. Status of Treaties, supra note 6.




41. Decree No. 5.758, of April 13, 2006, OFFICIAL DIARY OF THE UNION of
17/4/2006 (Braz.).
42. Id. In efforts to consolidate various plans arising out of the above men-
tioned, and other, environmental protection laws, the federal government of
Brazil created the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. MINISTRY
OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 26, at 18. This comprehensive compilation
contains all of the laws and implementation plans that have been created for
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A. The Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural
Resources and the Fight Against Deforestation
Over the course of the early 2000’s the IBAMA was immense-
ly successful in enacting and enforcing environmental protec-
tion regulations, particularly with respect to prevention of ille-
gal deforestation.43 Reuters reported that, between the years of
2004–2012, the IBAMA was responsible for the reduction of
deforestation in Brazil by a whopping 80%.44 Despite IBAMA’s
successes, there has been a recent resurgence of illegal defor-
estation.45 In fact, Brazil saw the highest levels of deforestation
in the Amazonian Rainforest since 2010, with a 39% increase
in deforestation during the first six months of 2019 as com-
pared to the same time period in 2018.46 One possible explana-
tion for the recent uptick in deforestation was the January
2019 election that saw Jair Bolsonaro elected President of Bra-
zil.47 While campaigning, Bolsonaro ran upon a conservative
platform which promoted deregulation and anti-enforcement of
the environmental regulations that protect the Brazilian Ama-
zonian Rainforest.48
Since assuming office, President Bolsonaro has taken the
IBAMA to task in attempt to thwart Brazil’s environmental
protection laws.49 Within the first eight months of his presiden-
cy, Bolsonaro fired numerous high ranking IBAMA officials50
and the head of the National Institute of Space Research
(INPE), a SISNAMA agency charged with tracking illegal de-
forestation of the Amazon from outer space.51 Furthermore,
the purpose of furthering the treaty obligations set forth in the Convention on
Biological Diversity. Id.
43. Casado & Londoño, supra note 13.
44. Spring & Eisenhammer, supra note 14.
45. Wallace, supra note 16.
46. Casado & Londoño, supra note 13.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Spring & Eisenhammer, supra note 14; see alsoWallace, supra note 16.
50. Wallace, supra note 16. President Bolsonaro “dismissed 21 of IBAMA’s
27 state superintendents,” and many of those positions had not yet been filled
by the time of the Note’s publication. Id. There was no mention within the
article as to whether President Bolsonaro intends to fill these vacancies or to
leave the positions unfilled. Id.
51. Ernesto Londoño, Bolsonaro Fires Head of Agency Tracking Amazon
Deforestation in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2019),
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IBAMA employees reported that, in addition to cutting the
agency’s budget, President Bolsonaro curtailed the agency’s
ability to monitor and control illegal deforestation in remote
areas of the Amazon due to reductions in IBAMA staffing.52
Whereas prior to the Bolsonaro administration, the IBAMA
was able to pursue and prevent those illegally logging in the
Amazon by destroying the logger’s harvesting tools, President
Bolsonaro has denounced such enforcement practices.53 IBAMA
officials claim that the increase in the deforestation of the Bra-
zilian Amazon can be attributed, in part, to President Bolso-
naro’s rhetoric, which has emboldened illegal logging.54 It is
important to note that the words and actions of President Bol-
sonaro, with respect to deforestation of the Amazon, are seem-
ingly direct contradictions of Brazil’s existing environmental
laws.55 President Bolsonaro’s rhetoric, which strongly calls for
a return to a policy of unbounded economic development of the
Amazon, is at odds with Decree 4.339’s objectives of preserva-
tion and conservation of the Amazon’s biological diversity.56
B. Threats to Biological Diversity: Deforestation, Forest Fires,
and Dieback
Over the course of the past thirty years, the Brazilian gov-
ernment has implemented a federal framework of environmen-
tal protection laws for the purpose of managing the unique bio-
logical resources found within its territorial jurisdiction.57 As
www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/world/americas/bolsonaro-amazon-
deforestation-galvao.html.
52. Spring & Eisenhammer, supra note 14.
53. Id.; see alsoWallace, supra note 16.
54. Spring, supra note 10; see also Spring & Eisenhammer, supra note 14.
55. MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 26, at 72.
56. For example, Article 5 of Decree 4.339 states that: “An ecologically bal-
anced environment is a universal right, as it is an asset of shared use and
vital for the healthy quality of life, where the duty to defend it and preserve it
for present and future generations falls to governments and the collective.”
Id. Furthermore, Article 14 requires that: “Ecosystem management shall
seek the appropriate balance between conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity, and ecosystems shall be managed within their functional lim-
its[;].” Id. Moreover, Article 17 asserts that: “Ecosystems shall be understood
and managed under an economic context, with the following objectives: a)
reduce market distortions that negatively affect biodiversity, b) promote in-
centives for biological conservation and sustainable use, and c) internalize as
much as possible the costs and benefits within the same ecosystem.” Id.
57. See generallyMINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 26.
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demonstrated in the 1960s and 1970s, a lack of federal man-
agement of the natural environment led to rampant deforesta-
tion of the Brazilian Amazonian Rainforest.58 Since the mid-
1980s, deforestation has been a genuine concern of the Brazili-
an government due to the disastrous effects that this practice
has upon the natural environment of the Amazon.59 The illegal
removal of trees from the rainforest greatly disturbs the natu-
ral balance of the Amazon’s natural ecosystem.60 The fragile
topsoil of the forest floor is eroded away by the removal of
trees, and, as a result, the portion of the forest damaged by the
logging is unable to generate new vegetative life.61 Additional-
ly, as the logger’s heavy equipment is mobilized through the
forest, the soil of the forest floor is further eroded as the
equipment is transported along the makeshift pathways creat-
ed by the illegal logging.62 Reporting in August 2019 for Na-
tional Geographic, journalist Scott Wallace detailed the surrep-
titious methods employed by the loggers who illegally harvest
trees from the Amazon.63 In his interviews with IBAMA offi-
cials, Wallace learned of how the loggers create narrow path-
ways under the canopy of the rainforest in order to obscure
their movement so as to remain undetected, prolong their ille-
gal activities, and gain access to valuable biological materials
located in remote areas of the Amazon.64
An ancillary problem of deforestation is fragmentation in the
canopy of the Amazonian Rainforest.65 Fragmentation occurs as
trees are harvested from, and transportation pathways are
carved out of, the rainforest’s canopy; as a result, the loggers
end up segmenting portions of the Amazonian Rainforest from
itself.66 This results in irreparable harm to the flora, fauna, and
other biologically diverse organisms inhabiting the areas of for-
58. McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 521.
59. Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 22, at 84.
60. McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 518.
61. Id.
62. Laurance, Vasconcelos & Lovejoy, supra note 18, at 39.
63. Wallace, supra note 16.
64. Id. Given the highly sophisticated tools utilized by the INPE in its
monitoring of deforestation in the Amazon, the illegal loggers have had to
engage in covert operations so that their logging practices remain undetected
by the INPE. Id.; see also Borunda, supra note 20.
65. Laurance, Vasconcelos & Lovejoy, supra note 18, at 39.
66. Id.
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est that have been fragmented as a result of deforestation.67
The illegal harvesting of trees not only destroys the organisms
residing within that habitat but also leaves vulnerable the hab-
itats located along the edges of the newly deforested, and now
fragmented, areas.68 Fragmentation disrupts the fragile nature
of the Amazon’s ecosystems, resulting in the displacement of
wildlife from their natural habitats and hinders the regrowth
of trees and other fauna.69
Additionally, fragmentation creates openings within the can-
opy of the rainforest, directly exposing the forest floor to the
sun.70 Normally, one can find detritus from felled trees and an-
imal remains, in various stages of decomposition, strewn about
the rainforest floor.71 The contiguous coverage of the rainfor-
est’s canopy typically prevents this debris from direct sun ex-
posure; however, when the canopy is fragmented, direct sun-
light withers the debris and transforms it into an ideal acceler-
ant for forest wildfires.72 Forest fires caused by deforestation
are characterized by plumes of smoke that reach high above
the earth’s atmosphere, in contrast to naturally occurring for-
est fires, which rarely occur and are more subdued in nature.73
Given that the smoke from the 2019 forest fires could be seen
from outer space, the INPE has determined through its satel-
lite imagery database that the forest fire smoke generated from
locations in which illegal deforestation activities are known to
67. Id. at 40–41.
68. Id.
69. Authors Laurance, et al., show that forest fragmentation can cause
“sharp increases in the rates of tree mortality, damages and canopy-gap for-
mation as a result of greater desiccation and wind turbulence near forest
edges.” Id. at 40. Additionally, forest fragmentation can disrupt the natural
habitats of many wildlife. Id. at 41. For example, a species’ migratory pat-
terns may be drastically changed because of the species’ biological aversion to
crossing a clearing within the forest as a result of fragmentation. Id. Given
that fragmentation creates an artificial forest edge, some species will be driv-
en from their habitats as a result of fragmentation. Id. On the other hand,
some species that need to flee their habitats, because it has been destroyed by
deforestation, will be unable to do so because of the species biological aver-
sion to crossing open forest clearings. Id. Given that forest fragmentation
creates new clearings within the forest, the migratory paths and patterns of
certain wildlife species will be disrupted as a result. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Wallace, supra note 16.
73. Borunda, supra note 20.
2020] The Amazon Ablaze 259
have occurred.74 Thus, scientists at the INPE and IBAMA be-
lieve that the recent increase in the unbridled deforestation
and fragmentation of the Amazonian Rainforest was the cata-
lyst for the fires that ravaged Brazil in the summer of 2019.75
Moreover, environmental scientists Thomas Lovejoy and Car-
los Nobre concluded that the Amazon Rainforest is dangerously
close to triggering dieback, an irrevocable condition of “self-
perpetuating deforestation.”76 Once forest fragmentation and
deforestation reaches a certain threshold, dieback will occur;
the triggering of this condition will send the ecosystem of the
Amazonian Rainforest into a state that would no longer be sus-
tainable.77 Thus, if these illegal practices persist and the condi-
tions for dieback are met, scientists predict that the following
positive feedback cycle will occur: (1) continued deforestation
and fragmentation will create an opening within the forest’s
canopy, reducing the forest’s ability to retain moisture; (2) the
increased sunlight exposure will dry out the debris located on
the forest floor and turn it into kindling for a forest fire, which
the rainforest is unable to self-regulate due to its lack of mois-
ture; and (3) as a result, the ensuing forest fire will create more
openings within the canopy of the rainforest.78 Lovejoy and
Nobre have estimated that dieback will occur once 20–25% of
the Amazonian Rainforest has been deforested.79 The New York
Times reported that, as of August 30, 2019, the Brazilian gov-
ernment estimates that approximately 19.3% of the Amazon
has already been deforested.80 Thus, if the tipping point is met,
and the Amazon succumbs to dieback, it would mean that the
world’s most biologically diverse rainforest ecosystem would no
longer be environmentally sustainable.81
C. Reactions from the International Community and Potential
Means for Recourse
Due to the sudden and intense resurgence of forest fires in
the Amazon, and the genuine concern for the loss of this biolog-
74. Id.
75. Id.





81. Id.; see generally Laurance, Vasconcelos & Lovejoy, supra note 18.
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ically diverse rainforest ecosystem, France offered Brazil $22
million dollars in international aid to combat the Amazonian
forest fires raging within the territorial jurisdiction of Brazil
during the August 2019 Group of Seven (G7) summit.82 Presi-
dent Bolsonaro, however, rejected France’s offer, shocking the
international community.83 Shortly thereafter, President Bol-
sonaro accepted twelve million dollars in aid from Great Brit-
ain.84 Nevertheless, despite the acceptance of international aid,
forest fires still consume swaths of the Amazonian Rainforest
in Brazil—unfortunately, an unsurprising result.85
Given the clear relationship between deforestation and forest
fires, it follows that no amount of international aid would be
able to dampen the flames when the forest fires are being
fueled by the Bolsonaro administration’s pro-deforestation poli-
cy.86 It seems that the most effective method for quelling the
forest fires in the Amazon would be to require that the Bolso-
naro administration adhere to and enforce Brazil’s existing en-
vironmental protection laws. Given that Brazil is party to the
82. Manuela Andreoni, Brazil Angrily Rejects Millions in Amazon Aid
Pledge at G7, Then Accepts British Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/world/americas/brazil-amazon-aid.html.
Moreover, as a signatory to the CBD, France was fulfilling its treaty obliga-
tions by offering to provide financial assistance to a fellow party member
when there is a “grave and imminent danger to. . . biological diversity.” See
also Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 8 & 14.
83. Andreoni, supra note 82. Apparently, President Bolsonaro received
President Macron’s offer of financial assistance as a slight against Brazil’s
sovereignty over the Brazilian Amazonian Rainforest. Id. President Bolso-
naro stated, in a series of successive twitter posts, that it is not for President
Macron of France to determine how the Amazonian fires should be addressed,
but rather, that a response plan should be created by the “majority of the
countries that make up the Amazon.” Jair Bolsonaro (@JairBolsonaro),
TWITTER (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:52 AM), https://
twitter.com/jairbolsonaro/status/1165970378470150146. Furthermore, Presi-
dent Bolsonaro stated that the adopted plan should “guarantee [the] sover-
eignty and natural wealth” of the Amazon. Id. The G7’s offer of financial sup-
port to “ ‘save’ the Amazon” was understood by Bolsonaro as disrespectful and
paternalistic. Id.
84. Andreoni, supra note 82.
85. See generally, Clifford Krauss, David Yaffe-Bellany & Mariana Simões,
Why Amazon Fire Keep Raging 10 Years After a Deal to End Them, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/10/10/world/americas/amazon-fires-brazil-
cattle.html?searchResultPosition=2.
86. Borunda, supra note 20; see also Andreoni, supra note 82.
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CBD, other members of this multilateral treaty can bring a
claim against Brazil by stating that the Bolsonaro administra-
tion has contravened its obligation to protect and promote the
preservation and conservation of biologically diverse environ-
ments. Since the Amazonian Rainforest spans a total of nine
countries, it follows that the remaining eight countries have a
vested interest in the preservation and conservation of the Am-
azon.87 As such, it would seem that one of these countries
would be best situated to claim that it has been harmed by
Brazil’s derogation from its treaty obligations.
II. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: OBLIGATIONS AND
POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR DEROGATION THEREFROM
This portion of the Note will examine the text of the CBD and
provide an in depth exploration of the various legal obligations
of the treaty signatories. Furthermore, the Bolsanaro admin-
istration’s actions will be placed within the context of the obli-
gations mandated under the CBD. This Note will then analyze
whether those actions of the Bolsonaro administration directly
violates any provision of the CBD and, if so, whether the CBD
provides a remedy for those CBD members that might bring a
claim against Brazil for breaching its treaty obligations.
A. Overview of Signatory Obligations Under the Convention on
Biological Diversity
In order to determine whether signatory members of the CBD
have a cognizable claim before the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal,
one must turn to the text of the treaty so as to ascertain the
obligations assumed by signatory members. Article 2 provides a
list of defined terms necessary for the proper interpretation of
the treaty.88 Understandably so, “biological diversity” is the
first term defined within the provision.89 Given the prominence
of this term, the definition in its entirety follows: “ ‘Biological
Diversity’ means the variability among living organisms from
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other
aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they
are part: this includes diversity within species, between species
87. Countries Sharing the Amazon Rainforest, supra note 9.
88. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 2.
89. Id.
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and ecosystems.”90 As to the obligations set forth in the treaty,
Article 1 of the CBD clearly states that the three overarching
objectives of the convention are: (1) the conservation of biologi-
cal diversity, (2) the sustainable use of biological resources, and
(3) the fair and equitable sharing of those utilized biological
resources.91 Article 3, which outlines the principle goal of the
multilateral treaty, however, affirms the sovereignty of con-
tracting parties by asserting that it is within the sovereign
right of each contracting nation to exploit the resources found
within its territorial jurisdiction, so long as the exploitation of
those resources are “pursuant to their own environmental poli-
cies.”92 This caveat will become very crucial in the analysis as
to whether the Bolsonaro administration’s endorsement of an
anti-enforcement policy, with respect to Brazil’s environmental
protection laws, qualifies as a derogation from its treaty obliga-
tions.
B. Potential for the Convention on Biological Diversity to Pro-
vide a Cause of Action, in Breach of Treaty Obligations, for
Failure to Promote In Situ Conservation
Given the above established general framework of treaty ob-
ligations, the specific CBD provisions that allow contracting
parties to bring a claim alleging a violation of a treaty provi-
sion may now be examined in depth. Article 27 governs the
procedure by which disputes arising under the CBD are to be
resolved as between contracting parties.93 It is important to
note that this provision provides for the resolution of disputes
regarding the interpretation and application of provisions with-
in the CBD.94 When given a plain meaning interpretation to
Article 27, it appears that a contracting party is able to bring
any cause of action, either before an arbitral tribunal or the
ICJ, with respect to another party member’s (mis)application of
CBD treaty provisions.95
Having established the adjudicative framework for claims
arising under the CBD, it is essential to analyze the affirma-
tive commands of those pertinent treaty provisions that govern
90. Id.
91. Id. art. 1.
92. Id. art. 3.
93. Id. art. 27.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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the means and methods by which a contracting party is to ef-
fectuate the general principles and objectives of the CBD. Arti-
cle 6 mandates that all contracting parties shall develop and
implement national plans or programs that promote the con-
servation of biologically diverse ecosystems.96 This command is
central to a contracting party’s effective implementation of its
treaty obligations.97 The World Conservation Union, which
published a manual to aid in the interpretation of the CBD,
highlights the significance of Article 6 by recognizing the inte-
gral role that the national plan or program has in forming the
essential framework for the implementation of conservation
practices.98 The CBD also identifies the “regulat[ion] or man-
age[ment]” of biologically diverse resources as an essential el-
ement for the promotion of in situ conservation, and thus, a
necessary component of any contracting party’s national plan
or program.99 Requiring contracting parties to “regulate or
manage” biological resources is an expansive command, and
this provision could be broadly interpreted as mandating con-
tracting parties to “regulate or manage” any and all environ-
mental activities that could adversely impact the biological di-
versity of an ecosystem.100
There is no doubt that Brazil implemented a national plan for
the conservation of biological diversity.101 Furthermore, the Na-
tional Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan clearly vests the
96. Id. art. 6.
97. LYLE GLOWKA, FRANÇOISE BURHENNE-GUILMIN & HUGH SYNGE in col-
laboration with JEFFREY A. MCNEELY & LOTHAR GÜNDLING , A GUIDE TO THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 29 (1994).
98. GLOWKA, supra note 97, at 29. Glowka states that the national plans
and programs implemented by contracting parties are intended to involve
multiple stakeholders during the planning process. Id. Various governmental
agencies, departments, and regulators, as well as representatives of the pri-
vate sector who would be affected by the implementation of the national plan
or program, are all intended to participate in the planning development pro-
cess. Id. Involving a multitude of stakeholders should, in theory, ensure that
the plan or program that is developed, and later implemented, strikes an ap-
propriate balance between the public and private interests with respect to the
conservation and sustainable use of biologically diverse resources. Id. Ulti-
mately, the goal of this deliberate and collaborative planning process is to
yield a successful implementation of the generated national plan or program.
Id.
99. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 8(c).
100. GLOWKA, supra note 97, at 40.
101. See generallyMINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 26.
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power to regulate and manage the implementation of the na-
tional plan among numerous SISNAMA agencies, such as the
IBAMA and the INPE, which are charged with the monitoring
and enforcement of Brazil’s environmental protection laws.102
The present issue, however, lies in the fact that the Bolsonaro
administration has actively taken steps to weaken the
IBAMA’s and the INPE’s ability to regulate or manage envi-
ronmental activities with respect to the Amazon.103 President
Bolsonaro has curbed the IBAMA’s ability to enforce environ-
mental protection laws pursuant to the National Biodiversity
Strategy and Action Plan, which has allowed for an increase in
the illegal deforestation of the Amazon.104 As a result, large
swaths of the Amazon have been destroyed by forest fires and
the destruction of these sensitive ecosystems threatens the bio-
logical diversity of the Amazonian rainforest.105 President Bol-
sonaro, however, has not completely denuded the IBAMA and
the INPE of its regulatory and management powers.106 These
federal environmental regulatory agencies are still functioning,
albeit with far fewer resources and with more limited authori-
ty, since President Bolsonaro took office in January of 2019.107
Nevertheless, President Bolsonaro’s anti-enforcement rheto-
ric, which encourages private actors to boundlessly develop the
102. Id. at 21–23.
103. See generally Londoño & Casado, supra note 12; see also Wallace, su-
pra note 16; Londoño, supra note 51.
104. Id.
105. See generally Laurance, Vasconcelos & Lovejoy, supra note 18; see also
Fisher, supra note 11.
106. Wallace, supra note 16. An IBAMA employee stated in an interview
with the National Geographic that they believe President Bolsonaro will not
completely “dismantle” the IBAMA. Id. The employee further stated that, in
order for President Bolsonaro to keep face with the international community,
it is crucial that he keeps the IBAMA running—even if that means that the
IBAMA is functioning on limited resources and authority. Id. According to
this employee, President Bolsonaro is motivated by the need for the “IBAMA
to show the world that Brazil is taking care of the Amazon.” Id. It could also
be argued that President Bolsonaro is influenced by more than just mere con-
cerns of public opinion and optics. Id. If, however, the Bolsonaro administra-
tion were to totally deconstruct the system of environmental protections es-
tablished in pursuance of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan,
and no subsequent regulatory or management system were implemented,
then legal liability would attach for a direct violation of Article 6 of the CBD.
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 6.
107. Wallace, supra note 16.
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Amazon,108 directly contradicts existing Brazilian environmen-
tal protection laws and the mandate of Brazil’s National Biodi-
versity Strategy and Action Plan.109 This shift in the federal
government’s environmental policy is seemingly irreconcilable
with the CBD’s Article 11 requirement that each contracting
party adopt social and economic policies that incentivize the
conservation and preservation of biologically diverse re-
sources.110 Moreover, this policy shift seems incongruent with
Article 8 of the CBD, which governs the obligations of contract-
ing parties with respect to in situ conservation.111 That article
states each party members shall, “as far as possible and as ap-
propriate,” establish a system of protected areas,112 ensure the
conservation and sustainable use,113 and development of biolog-
ically diverse resources located within, and outside of, protect-
ed areas.114 By weakening the IBAMA, the Bolsonaro admin-
istration is intentionally hamstringing the federal agencies
vested with the power of ensuring that the biologically diverse
resources located within, and surrounding, the Amazonian
rainforest are sustainably developed and used.
It is important to note, however, that the CBD does not cate-
gorically bar contracting parties from using those biological re-
sources; rather, one of the stated objectives of the CBD is that
contracting states “sustainably use” the biological resources
108. See generally Casado & Londoño, supra note 13; see also McGee &
Zimmerman, supra note 7; Drummond & Barros-Platiau, supra note 22.
109. See generallyMINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 26.
110. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 11.
111. The CBD defines “in situ conservation” as “the conservation of ecosys-
tems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable popu-
lation of species in their natural surroundings and, in the case of domesticat-
ed or cultivate species, in the surroundings where they have developed their
distinctive properties.” Id. art. 2 & 8.
112. Id. art. 8(a) (Article 2 of the CBD defines “[p]rotected area” as a “geo-
graphically defined area which is designated or regulated and managed to
achieve specific conservation objectives.”).
113. Id. art. 8(e) (Article 2 of the CBD defines “[s]ustainable use” as “the
use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not
lead to long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its po-
tential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future genera-
tions.”).
114. Id., art. 8(e). Specifically, the CBD calls for each contracting party to
“promote environmentally sound and sustainable development in areas adja-
cent to protected areas with a view to furthering protection of these areas.”
Id.
266 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 46:1
located within their territorial jurisdictions.115 With respect to
the sustainable use of biologically diverse resources, Article 10
of the CBD states that the contracting parties must adopt re-
source procurement methods that would minimize the potential
adverse effects that resource procurement could have on the
environment.116 One way that contracting parties can work to-
wards minimizing the potential adverse effects of resource use
is by “encourag[ing] cooperation” between the government and
the private sector, which would be engaged in the “sustainable
use of biological resources.”117 President Bolsonaro, unfortu-
nately, has not adopted the collaborative public-private ap-
proach. Instead of working with the private sector to develop
sustainable methods of logging, for example, President Bolso-
naro’s pro-deforestation policies have encouraged citizens to
engage in illegal deforestation practices—in direct contraven-
tion of the laws promulgated by the Brazilian government and
the CBD, which the Note will later address in further detail.118
Given the totality of the circumstances, it appears that the
actions of the Bolsonaro administration may qualify as a dero-
gation from a contracting party’s obligations under the CBD.
There is a seemingly colorable legal argument that the Bolso-
naro administration’s policies with respect to the Amazonian
Rainforest actively undermines the stated conservation and
sustainable use and development objectives of the CBD.119
Nevertheless, if a contracting party were to bring an action
against Brazil, claiming violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the
CBD, those colorable legal arguments would be challenged by a
claim of national sovereignty on behalf of Brazil.120 Brazil
would likely argue that it is well within the right of a sovereign
nation to change position with respect to domestic policy
points. In fact, one would need to look no further than Article 3
of the CBD to find an affirmation of the contracting parties’
sovereignty rights.121 This affirmation, however, is not an un-
qualified assertion of absolute sovereignty; below Article 3, and
its limiting provisions, is replicated in its entirety:
115. Id. art. 6(a).
116. Id. art. 10.
117. Id.
118. Casado & Londoño, supra note 13.
119. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 1.
120. Id. art. 3, 8 & 10.
121. Id. art. 3.
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own en-
vironmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that ac-
tivities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
age to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limit of national jurisdiction.122
While the provision above does expressly acknowledge the
sovereignty of nations, this declaration is qualified by the
statement that a state’s exploitation of resources must be in
accordance with the state’s own environmental policies.123 Un-
fortunately, Article 2 of the CBD does not define environmental
policy.Merriam-Webster, on the other hand, defines policy as “a
high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and ac-
ceptable procedures especially of a governmental body.”124 This
definition, unfortunately, brings one no closer to discerning
whether the treaty drafters intended the phrase “pursuant to
their own environmental policies” to mean that contracting
parties must adhere to the environmental rules and regula-
tions as promulgated by the government, or that the contract-
ing parties must adhere to the environmental policies of the
sitting administration.125 Thus, one could argue that Brazil is
exercising its sovereign right to exploit its own resources pur-
suant to the current administration’s environmental policies
with respect to development in the Amazonian Rainforest. This
argument, however, is tempered when Article 3 is read in light
of the CBD as a whole, especially when particular focus is
placed upon Article 8.126 In numerous instances throughout the
CBD, the convention requires contracting parties to establish
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. Policy, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/policy (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
125. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 3.
126. Article 8, which governs in situ conservation, commands contracting
parties to take affirmative steps towards creating legislation for the protec-
tion of biologically diverse resources. Id. art. 8. For example, Clause K re-
quires that contracting parties “develop or maintain necessary legislation
and/or other regulatory provisions for the protection of threatened species
and populations.” Id. Furthermore, Clause J mandates contracting parties to
act in accordance with existing legislation. Id. Thus, the CBD requires con-
tracting parties to adhere to, and expound upon, existing environmental pro-
tection laws. Id.
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and maintain legislation, national plans, programs, or policies,
for the conservation and sustainable use of biologically diverse
resources.127 Thus, it would seem inapposite to find that a con-
tracting party’s derogation away from its own laws and pro-
grams, simply because there has been a change in political
power, as acceptable behavior under the CBD.
The CBD places an additional limitation upon the absolute
sovereignty of contracting parties by specifically prohibiting
state action that would create a transboundary harm.128 Article
3 of the CBD states that all contracting parties are required to
ensure that any activity originating within its territorial juris-
diction does not cause damage to the environment of another
contracting party.129 This prohibition against the commission of
transboundary environmental harms is central to the overall
purpose of the CBD.130 Even though Article 3 of the CBD af-
firms the sovereignty of all contracting parties, the preamble of
the convention clearly states that the “conservation of biologi-
cal diversity is a common concern of humankind.”131 Thus,
while the sovereignty of the nation is recognized, it is also un-
derstood that multiple stakeholders have an interest in the
conservation of biological diversity within an environment.132
Given the interconnectedness of the Amazon’s ecosystem,
which transcends a number of territorial jurisdictions, the CBD
acknowledges the effect that in situ conservation, or lack
thereof, can have on the overall biodiversity of an ecosystem.133
Thus, if a contracting party were to flout its treaty obligations
with respect to the in situ conservation of its own biologically
diverse environments, this lack of in situ conservation could
result in damages to the biological diversity of an interconnect-
ed ecosystem which extends into the territorial jurisdiction of a
neighboring nation.134
127. See generally id. art. 6, 8, 10 & 19.
128. Id. art. 3.
129. Id.
130. GLOWKA, supra note 97, at 10.
131. Id.
132. Noting that protection of the environment is “not [an] exclusive na-
tional affair.” Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 3.
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C. Potential of a Party Member to Bring a Cause of Action
Against Brazil Claiming that the Bolsonaro Administration has
Facilitated a Transboundary Environmental Harm in Contra-
vention of the Convention on Biological Diversity
Article 14 of the Convention defines the procedure by which a
contracting party is obligated to notify other CBD party mem-
bers of an adverse environmental event that could result in a
transboundary harm, which would have a negative environ-
mental impact on the environment of other contracting par-
ties.135 Clause D of this provision specifies that, if an activity or
environmental condition within the territorial jurisdiction of a
contracting party presents a threat of imminent environmental
danger or damage, the contracting party must notify all other
contracting parties that their environment could potentially be
affected by this imminent damage or danger.136 In addition to
providing notice, the contracting party must take affirmative
measures to prevent the adverse environmental impact from
occurring.137 Interestingly, however, the command that a con-
tracting party member notify or take preventative steps when
there is a grave or imminent danger to biological diversity is
predicated on the qualification that “each contracting party, as
far as possible and appropriate, shall [notify].”138 Furthermore
and most importantly, a contracting party’s obligation to notify
and prevent further damage is only triggered if the environ-
mental danger or damage transgresses the territorial bounda-
135. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 14. Article 14 of
the CBD states that:
Each Contracting Party, as far as possible and appropriate,
shall: . . . (d) In the case of imminent or grave danger or
damage, originating under its jurisdiction or control, to bio-
logical diversity within the area under jurisdiction of other
States or in areas beyond the limits of such danger or dam-
age, as well as initiate action to prevent or minimize such
danger or damage; and (e) Promote national arrangements
for emergency responses to activities or events, whether
caused naturally or otherwise, which present a grave and
imminent danger to biological diversity and encourage in-
ternational cooperation to supplement such national efforts
and, where appropriate and agreed by the States or regional
economic integration organizations concerned, to establish
joint contingency plans. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
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ries of another nation.139 As such, contracting parties have
great latitude with respect to when they are required to notify
and engage in preventative measures, all of which is predicated
on the distinction as to whether the impending environmental
damage or danger is considered imminent.140
Given the nature of the harm unfolding in Brazil, it is rather
difficult to clearly articulate that there is an imminent threat
of a transboundary harm, which would trigger the Article 14
obligation of notification and prevention. There is no doubt that
illegal logging and deforestation of the Brazilian Amazonian
Rainforest has been on the rise since President Bolsonaro took
office in January 2019.141 As previously stated, Brazil has seen
a 39% increase in deforestation within the first six months of
President Bolsonaro’s tenure.142 This drastic increase in defor-
estation and fragmentation of the rainforest canopy has subse-
quently led to the devastating, manmade forest fires that
plagued the Brazilian Amazonian Rainforest throughout the
Summer of 2019.143 The INPE reported that, as of August of
2019, the Brazilian Amazon had experienced over 76,000 forest
fires in that year alone.144 To be sure, these forest fires are a
direct threat to the in situ conservation of the biologically di-
verse resources indigenous to the Brazilian Amazon Rainfor-
est.145 As the rainforest ecosystem continues to be depleted by
persistent deforestation and forest fragmentation, the areas
that were once rich with biological diversity are now devoid of
flora and fauna because these species have been eradicated
from their natural habitats by fires and deforestation.146 The
concern of continued environmental degradation due to defor-
estation is not strictly a Brazilian issue, limited only to the
consideration of in situ conservation.147 Contrarily, this Brazil-
ian environmental harm could transition into a transboundary
139. GLOWKA, supra note 97, at 74.
140. The author notes that theses notification Clauses in the CBD are ra-
ther weak as compared to the notification provisions of other international
agreements that were in existence at the time that the CBD was enacted. Id.
141. Casado & Londoño, supra note 13.
142. Id.; see also Borunda, supra note 20.
143. Borunda, supra note 20.
144. Id.
145. GLOWKA, supra note 97, at 11; see generally Laurance, Vasconcelos &
Lovejoy, supra note 18.
146. See generally Laurance, Vasconcelos & Lovejoy, supra note 18.
147. GLOWKA, supra note 97, at 11.
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harm in the sense that the Amazonian Rainforest as a whole
will likely succumb to dieback, if this vicious cycle of deforesta-
tion, rainforest fragmentation, and resulting forest fires, is not
stopped.148 If the Amazonian Rainforest were to be totally lost
as a result of dieback, it would seem as though the CBD would
certainly qualify the loss of the world’s most biologically di-
verse ecosystem as a transboundary harm.149
The Amazonian Rainforest, however, has not yet succumbed
to dieback.150 Although the threat of dieback is quite severe,
the question remains as to whether the threat of dieback is an
imminent danger or damage as defined in the CBD.151 If so, the
notification and prevention obligations as set forth in Clause D
of Article 14 would be triggered, and the Bolsonaro administra-
tion would be required to take remedial actions to prevent the
imminent danger or damage of dieback.152 If not, the CBD re-
quires nothing more from the contracting parties than to “pro-
mote notification,” that is, the contracting party only has to
“promote” the “notification” of a “significantly adverse” harm to
those other nations that would be injured by the likely harm.153
In order to make this determination as to the drafters’ inten-
tions with respect to whether an environmental danger or
damage is considered imminent, the language of the treaty
must be interpreted. Yet again, Article 2 does not provide a def-
inition of the word imminent.154 When Clauses C and D of Arti-
cle 14 are read together, however, the sparse requirements of
Clause C shed some light upon the intended application of the
148. Fisher, supra note 11.
149. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 14(d); see also
Amazon Rainforest, supra note 7.
150. Fisher, supra note 11.
151. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 14(d) (emphasis
added).
152. The thought of requiring the Bolsonaro administration to take preven-
tative action, or ameliorative action, as to completely avoid or lessen the dan-
ger or damage that would be realized upon the imminence of the dieback
threat is oxymoronic. Given the nature of this harm, the awful reality is that
once the triggering conditions for dieback have been met, there is no way in
which the harm can be reversed. Fisher, supra note 11; see also Laurance,
Vasconcelos & Lovejoy, supra note 18.
153. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 14(c).
154. Id. art. 2. Merriam- Webster, however, defines imminent as “ready to
take place; happening soon.” Imminent, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imminent. (last visited Nov. 18,
2019),
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notification and prevention obligations as set forth in Clause D,
which governs imminent danger or damage.155 For instances in
which an environmental harm is “likely” and “significantly” to
occur, Article 14(c) states that contracting parties are merely
obligated to “promote notification” to those parties that would
be injured by the likely harm.156 Clause D, however, states that
when there is an instance of imminent danger or damage, con-
tracting parties are obligated to immediately contact those par-
ties that will be affected, and parties are additionally obligated
to take preventative measure to stop the imminent harm from
occurring.157
When these definitions are applied to the current state of the
deforestation and occurrences of forest fires in the Amazon, one
can see that the Clause C definition of “likely” and “significant-
ly” to occur is better suited to describe the impending threat of
dieback. As previously stated by leading environmental scien-
tists Carlos Nobre and Thomas Lovejoy, it is believed that the
“tipping point” condition for the triggering of the dieback will
occur when approximately 20–25% of the Amazonian Rainfor-
est has been deforested.158 Once dieback has been triggered,
however, there is no means or methods currently available to
stop or reverse the positive feedback cycle of self-destruction.159
Lovejoy makes it quite clear that if the tipping point condition
for dieback were triggered, the Amazonian Rainforest would no
longer be subsistent, let alone able to generate new flora in
support of the rainforest’s existing biologically diverse ecosys-
tems.160 Furthermore, Lovejoy believes that approximately
19.3% of the Amazonian Rainforest, in total, has suffered de-
forestation.161 Thus, the tipping point condition has not yet
been met, though it is frightfully close.162
Given that the tipping point has not yet occurred, it would
seem that the impending threat of dieback does not arise to the
level of imminent danger or damage, as described in the
155. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 14(c) & (d).
156. Id. art. 14(c).
157. Id. art. 14(d) (emphasis added).
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CBD.163 Article 14, Clause D, when read in light of Clause C,
seems to suggest that the imminent danger or damage is in
reference to a danger or damage the could occur at any mo-
ment.164 Given the assurance of the environmental harm, the
Convention thus requires contracting parties to notify others of
the forthcoming injury.165 Clause C, however, seems to envision
a slightly longer timeframe before the environmental harm is
realized.166 Thus, the distinction between the two clauses ap-
pears to be one of degree with respect to the immediacy of
when the environmental harm will be realized.167 This may feel
like splitting hairs, especially when it comes to the magnitude
of harm to be realized in environmental injuries, particularly
with respect to the threat of dieback in the Amazonian Rain-
forest. Nevertheless, given the fact that the dieback condition
has not yet been triggered, it would seem as though the threat
of dieback does not qualify as an imminent danger or damage
in the form of a transboundary harm.168
CONCLUSION
The ultimate inquiry in this analysis is: can the international
community rely upon the provisions within the CBD as a
mechanism for holding the Bolsonaro Administration account-
able to its treaty obligations? Upon completion of the above
analysis, the answer to this question is no. With respect to a
claim of failure to promote in situ conservation, it would be
hard to argue before the ICJ that Brazil is failing to meet the
regulatory and management requirements set forth in Article 6
of the CBD since the IBAMA and the INPE are still active fed-
eral environmental regulation agencies.169 Even though the
agency’s ability to regulate and manage environmental protec-
tion laws have been drastically curtailed due to budget cuts by
the Bolsonaro administration, that does not mean that Brazil is
in contravention of its treaty obligations because the agencies
charged with regulating and managing the National Biodiver-
163. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 14.
164. Id. art. 14(c) & (d).
165. Id. art. 14(c).
166. Id.
167. Id. art. 14(c) & (d).
168. Id.
169. Id. art. 6; see Londoño & Casado, supra note 12; see alsoWallace, supra
note 16; Londoño, supra note 51.
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sity Strategy and Action Plan have not been completely dis-
mantled.170 Furthermore, the Bolsonaro Administration would
heavily rely upon the CBD’s affirmative recognitions of sover-
eignty as found in Article 3 of the Convention.171 This provision
clearly states that contracting parties must adhere to their own
environmental policies,172 and the Bolsonaro Administration
would be able to defend its shift in environmental protection
policies as a reflection of the political process and Brazil’s re-
cent shift towards the conservative party.173 Moreover, contact-
ing parties would struggle to bring a claim of transboundary
harm against Brazil. Given that the Amazonian Rainforest
fires of 2019 were confined to the territorial jurisdiction of Bra-
zil, and the conditions for die-back have not yet been trig-
gered,174 no contracting party would be able to assert a claim of
transboundary harm under Article 14 of the CBD.175 Bearing in
mind the fact that the CBD was created for the purpose of pro-
tecting the biological diversity of the world’s most sensitive
ecosystems, it is rather disheartening to come to the conclusion
that the international community would likely be unable to re-
ly upon the Convention for protecting the Brazilian Amazonian
Rainforest against rampant deforestation and the ensuing for-
est fires.
Jordan Johnson *
170. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 6; see generally
MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 26.
171. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 3.
172. Id.
173. Casado & Londoño, supra note 13.
174. Fisher, supra note 11.
175. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, art. 14.
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